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Abstract
In this paper, we approach the problem of classical recapture for LP and K3 by using normality
operators. These generalize the consistency and determinedness operators from Logics of Formal
Inconsistency and Underterminedness, by expressing, in any many-valued logic, that a given formula
has a classical truth value (0 or 1). In particular, in the first part of the paper we introduce the
logics LP⊛ and K⊛3 , which extends LP and K3 with normality operators, and we establish a classical
recapture result based on the two logics. In the second part of the paper, we compare the approach
in terms of normality operators with an established approach to classical recapture, namely minimal
inconsistency. Finally, we discuss technical issues connecting LP⊛ and K⊛3 to the tradition of Logics
of Formal Inconsistency and Underterminedness.
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1 Introduction
The philosophical applications of many-valued logics usually come with a story of
‘normality’: there are a number of ‘abnormal phenomena’ for which we need many-
valued reasoning—logical paradoxes, partial information, vagueness, among others—
but as long as the situation is normal—that is, no abnormal phenomena is at stake—
classical logic is perfectly in order as it is.
This view motivates the following question: how can we recapture Classical Logic
CL in many-valued logic? That is, how can we secure inference of classical conclusions,
under the assumption that we are facing no abnormality? [2, 6, 7, 23, 24] The question
fits the broad conceptual view on many-valued reasoning by the ‘normality story’
above: if detour from classical reasoning is motivated by specific phenomena, then we
do not need to take it when these phenomena are not around. Numerous as these may
be, we may assume that they are not ubiquitous. For instance, take semantical and
set-theoretical paradoxes; to put it with [23, p.235]: ‘paradoxical sentences seem to
be a fairly small proportion of the sentences we reason with. . . It would seem plausible
to claim that in our day-to-day reasoning we (quite correctly) presuppose that we are
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not dealing with paradoxical claims’. [6, p.326] generalizes this remark to absence of
any abnormality: ‘The basic thought is that classical logic is ‘right’ (in some sense)
for the broad array of ‘normal’ cases; however, various ‘abnormal’ [...] phenomena
motivate a slightly weaker logic’. In a nutshell, if one follows the ‘normality story’
above, then one may just want to resort to classical reasoning when possible—that is,
in ‘normal situations.’
Recapture of classical reasoning proves desirable even if we do not endorse the
‘normality story’ above. Indeed, the many-valued strategy in dealing with abnormal
phenomena consists in weakening classical logic by dropping those laws or rules that
lead to undesirable conclusions when abnormal phenomena are at stake. These are,
typically, the Law of Excluded Middle ⊧ φ∨¬φ and Ex Contradiction Quodlibet φ∧¬φ ⊧
ψ. However, every many-valued systems comes with further failures. In particular,
some desirable laws or rules are falsified. For instance, the Law of Identity ⊧ φ ⊃ φ is
not valid in the strong Kleene logic K3 [17, 18], but this looks like a basic validity, and
we might want to have it available when possible. Also, Modus Ponens φ,φ ⊃ ψ ⊧ ψ
is not valid in the Logic of Paradox LP [23, 25], but again, this is the most basic
inference rule of our reasoning, and we might want to use it, when possible. In sum,
ability to display classical reasoning when possible is a desideratum. In order to fulfill
it, we need to answer the question about classical recapture.
An established approach to classical recapture is ‘minimal inconsistency’ by [24],
which resorts to a non-monotonic consequence relation that preserves the valid infer-
ences of LP and recapture classical reasoning, under the proviso that the premise-set
has a classical model.
In this paper, we extend the Kleene logics1 LP and K3 via the normality operator ⊛,
thus yielding the logics LP⊛ and K⊛3 . In both logics, ⊛φ expresses that φ has a classical
value (0 or 1). We show that the normality operator guarantees recapture of classical
reasoning (Theorem 3.3), and we compare our approach to minimal inconsistency.
We focus on Kleene logics and their extensions since these are the most widespread
formalism in philosophical logic.
The proposal of this paper has close connections with the Logics of Formal Inconsis-
tency (from now on, LFIs) by [10, 12, 20] and the Logics of Formal Undeterminedness
(from now on, LFUs) by [11, 28]. LFIs stem from [12] and have been later developed
in a number of works, including [10, 20]. They are a family of paraconsistent systems
that control the behavior of contradictions—and sort them out—by internalizing the
notion of consistency2 in the language, and expressing whether a formula is consis-
tent or not.3 LFUs [5, 11, 28] dualize the project of LFIs, and they control—and sort
out—undetermined formulas by internalizing the notion of undeterminedness in the
language. Definition 2.2 from Section 2 makes it clear that our normality operator
generalizes the consistency and determinedness operators. However, in the three-
1We choose this label for the sake of simplicity, since the connectives of LP and K3 are interpreted on Kleene
algebras. However, notice that a paraconsistent logic such as LP was not part of the philosophical and mathematical
project by Kleene, which instead aimed at the construction of paracomplete formalisms.
2The original proposal by [12] included an inconsistency operator ● that helps express that a formula is incon-
sistent. In many logics in the LFI family, this operator is the dual of a consistency operator ○—with ○φ expressing
that φ is consistent. Since [20], the use of ○ as a primitive has become standard in LFIs.
3LFIs include a wide variety of systems. Some of the, as the C-systems introduced by [12], lack a traditional
truth-functional semantics, but have been given a non-deterministic many-valued semantics by [4]. Others, like the
logics LFI1 and LFI2 from [10] and LFI3 from [21], have a straightforward many-valued semantics, which bring them
closer to the Kleene logics that we face in this paper.
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valued case, the normality operator comes to coincide with the consistency operator
by LFIs or with the determinednedness operator from LFUs—see Section 2, where
we go through the connections between the three operators and we explain why we
keep the normality operator distinct from the other two. Additionally we discuss the
connections between the present approach, LFIs, and LFUs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the logics LP⊛ and K⊛3 and
presents the main failures of classical inferences in these logics. Section 3 establishes
a classical recapture result (Theorem 3.3) for LP⊛ and K⊛3 and presents some concrete
examples of how classical inferences can be recaptured in these two logics. Section 4
introduces the approach by minimal inconsistency and compare it with our approach
based on normality operators. Section 5 discusses the relations between our proposal
and the tradition of LFIs and LFUs. In particular, we discuss the relations between
Theorem 3.3 and the Derivability Adjustment Theorems from [11, 20], the relations
between LP⊛ and LFI1, and some other issues. Section 6 sums up the results of the
paper.
2 Extensions of Kleene logics with Normality Operators
In this section we define normality operators and we introduce the two logics LP⊛
and K⊛3 , whose language deploy normality operators. Also, we discuss the relations
between these logics and the Kleene logics LP and K3, as well as some relevant failures
of classical laws and inference rules.
Preliminaries. In this paper we adopt a semantic angle, and we regard a logic S
as a pair (L,⊧S), where L is a language and ⊧S is the relation of (single-conclusion)
S-consequence—that is, ⊧S ⊆ ℘(L)×L. Given a nonempty set T of truth values and a
logic S, we denote by DS ⊆ T the set of designated values of S—that is, the values that
must be preserved through the valid inferences of S. We define the relative notion of
logical consequence—S-consequence—as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Logical Consequence in Many-valued Logic)
Σ ⊧S ψ ⇔ VS(Σ) ⊆ VS(ψ)
where VS(Σ) is the set of those valuations v defined for S where v(φ) ∈ DS for every
φ ∈ Σ. Σ ⊧S ψ reads ‘ψ is a S-consequence of Σ’. We write φ ⊧S ψ instead of {φ} ⊧S ψ,
and we write ⊧S ψ instead of ∅ ⊧S ψ in order to express that ψ is a tautology of S.
Now we give a semantical definition of the main logical operators of the paper:
Definition 2.2
For every many-valued logic S and valuation function n defined for S, a unary connec-
tive k is a normality operator iff (if and only if) it obeys the following truth clause:
n(kφ) = 1 ⇔ n(φ) ∈ {0,1} and n(kφ) = 0 ⇔ n(φ) ∉ {0,1}
Consistency, Determinedness and Normality Operators. The normality op-
erator from Definition 2.2 is closely related to the main operators in LFIs and LFUs.
In LFIs, a unary connective k is a consistency operator in a logic S iff [20] S is para-
consistent—that is, it fails Ex Contradictione Quodlibet (ECQ)—and k verifies the
Principle of Gentle Explosion (PGE) in S, respectively:
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φ,¬φ /⊧S ψ
φ,¬φ, kφ ⊧S ψ
In LFUs, a unary connective k is a determinedness operator in a logic S iff [28] S
is paracomplete—that is, it fails the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM)—and k verifies
the Principle of Gentle Implosion (GPI) in S, respectively:/⊧S φ ∨ ¬φ⊧S φ ∨ ¬φ ∨ kφ
It is straightforward to see that a normality operator satisfies PGE in a paraconsis-
tent many-valued logic, and PGI in a paracomplete many-valued logic. This implies
that, in the logics we consider here, the normality operator will collapse on one of
the two operators above. This notwithstanding, we choose here to use the label ‘nor-
mality operator’, for two reasons. First, this allows us to refer to the operator in a
unique way, no matter whether we are dealing with the paraconsistent or paracom-
plete case. This has practical advantages, since here we face both cases. Second, the
coincidence between the three operators is lost if more than three values are at stake.
In particular, the consistency operator ○′ by [22] and the determinedness operator by
[5] are defined in four-valued settings that are paraconsistent due to a non-classical
designated value (b), and paracomplete due to a non-classical undesignated value (n).
Thus, although the normality operator collapses on the consistency (or determined-
ness) operator is three-values are considered, it proves a distinct operator if more than
three values are at stake.4
Syntax. Given a nonempty denumerable set P = {p, q, r . . .} of propositional vari-
ables, the language L1(P) of LP⊛ and K⊛3 is defined by the following Backus-Naur
form (BNF):
φ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬φ ∣ φ ∨ ψ ∣ φ ∧ ψ ∣ ⊛φ
where p ∈ P, connectives ¬, ∨, ∧ receive their usual informal readings (negation,
disjunction, conjunction), and ⊛φ reads ‘φ has a classical truth value’. We define
φ ⊃ ψ as an abbreviation for ¬φ ∨ ψ. We denote sets of arbitrary formulas in L1(P)
by ∆, Γ, Σ, . . . and we omit reference to P when possible. var(φ) is the set of propo-
sitional variables occurring in φ ∈ L1; we use var(Σ) as short for ⋃φ∈Σ var(φ).
Semantics. Variables in P are assigned a truth value from the triple {0, 1
2
,1} by
a valuation function ν ∶ P z→ {0, 1
2
,1}. The function is generalized to arbitrary
formulas as follows:
Definition 2.3
A valuation ν ∶ L1 z→ {0, 12 ,1} is the unique extension of ν ∶ P z→ {0, 12 ,1} that is
induced by Table 1.5
We denote by V the set {ν, ν′, ν′′, . . .} of valuations defined in accordance with
Definition 2.3. The designated values of a logic S are the truth values that the logic
4The label ‘classicality operator’ is also used for operators that rule out both inconsistency and
undeterminedness—see for instance [22]. We prefer the label ‘normality operator’, since it makes a more direct
connection with the ‘normality story’ that motivates classical recapture.
5We are including ⊃ in Table 1, for the sake of simplicity. This will help track failures of Modus Ponens, Tollens,
and Transitivity of ⊃ in LP—see below.
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preserves through valid inferences. In particular, DK⊛3 = {1} is the set of designated
values of K3, and DLP⊛ = { 12 ,1} is the set of designated values of LP⊛.
The operator ⊛ obeys Definition 2.2, thus qualifying as a normality operator. Spe-
cific interpretations of ⊛φ depends on the logic in question. Given DLP⊛ = { 12 ,1} and
the behavior of ∧, ¬ and ⊛ from Table 1, we have that VLP⊛(⊛φ) = {ν ∈ V ∣ ν(φ∧¬φ) =
0}. As a consequence, in LP⊛, ⊛φ reads ‘φ is consistent ’, and ⊛ works as a consistency
operator like the one by [10]. This is relevant since some contradictions are satisfiable
in LP⊛, as we shall see below by Fact 2.6 and paraconsistency of LP.
By contrast, DK⊛3 = {1} implies that VK⊛3 (⊛φ) = {ν ∈ V ∣ ν(φ ∨ ¬φ) = 1}; that is,
in K⊛3 , ⊛ works as a determinedness operator, with ⊛φ stating that φ is determined.
This is relevant, since from Fact 2.6 and paracompleteness of K3 imply that K
⊛
3 is
itself paracomplete (see below).
2.1 Kleene Logics
We obtain the language L2 of Kleene logics by restricting L1 to those formulas where
operator ⊛ does not occur. The valuation function for interpreting L2 in a Kleene
logic obtains accordingly:
Definition 2.4 (Valuations for Kleene logics)
A valuation u ∶ L2 z→ {0, 12 ,1} is the unique extension of ν ∶ P z→ {0, 12 ,1} that is
induced by the relevant components of Table 1.
We denote by U the set {u,u′, u′′, . . .} of valuations defined in accordance with
Definition 2.4. The logic of paradox LP can be though of as the restriction of LP⊛
to L2, and the strong Kleene logic K3 can be thought as the restriction of K⊛3 to L2.
This implies that DLP⊛ = DLP and DK⊛3 = DK3 .
Relations between Kleene Logics and logics LP⊛ and K⊛3 . In LP, no formula φ
can express that a formula ψ is consistent, and, in K3, no formula φ can express that
a formula ψ is undetermined :
Fact 2.5
For every φ,ψ ∈ L2:
u(φ) ∈ DLP /⇒ u(ψ) ∈ {0,1}
u(φ) ∈ DK3 /⇒ u(ψ) = 12
By contrast, in LP⊛, we have that ν(⊛φ) ∈ DLP⊛ ⇒ ν(φ) ∈ {0,1}, and in K3, we
have that ν(¬ ⊛ φ) ∈ DK⊛3 ⇒ ν(φ) = 12 , by Definition 2.2. Thus, LP⊛ and K⊛3 brings a
real increase in the expressive power of LP and K3. Fact 2.6 below clarifies what this
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increase amounts to, exactly. In particular, LP⊛ and K⊛3 are conservative extensions
of LP and K3, respectively:
6
Fact 2.6
Given S ∈ {LP,K3} and S⊛ ∈ {LP⊛,K⊛3 }, if Σ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L2, then the following holds:
Σ ⊧S⊛ ψ⇔ Σ ⊧S ψ
Failures of classical laws and inferences. Kleene logics are weaker than classical
logic CL:7 they fail some classical laws or rules of inferences. Here is a list of their
most relevant failures:/⊧K3 φ, where φ is a classical tautology No TAUT/⊧K3 φ ∨ ¬φ Failure of LEM
φ ∧ ¬φ /⊧LP ψ Failure of ECQ⊧LP φ for all and only classical tautologies φ
φ,φ ⊃ ψ /⊧LP ψ Failure of MP¬ψ,φ ⊃ ψ /⊧LP ¬φ Failure of MT
φ ⊃ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) /⊧LP ¬φ Failure of RAA
φ ⊃ ψ,ψ ⊃ ζ /⊧LP φ ⊃ ζ Failure of Tr ⊃/⊧K3 φ ⊃ φ Failure of the Law of Identity
Due to Fact 2.6, the above failures extend to LP⊛ and K⊛3 . Thus, LP⊛ is a para-
consistent logic and K⊛3 is a paracomplete logic. A major difference with LP and K3,
however, is that LP⊛ and K⊛3 can recapture classical inferences and laws. It is to this
topic that we now turn.
We define the valuation function of classical logic CL as restriction of u to {0,1}.
We define UCL = {u ∈ U ∣ u(φ) ∈ {0,1} for every φ ∈ L2} and DCL = {1}. This yieldsUCL ⊂ U . The set UCL(Σ) of classical models of Σ ⊆ L2 is defined as {u ∈ UCL ∣ u(φ) = 1
for every φ ∈ Σ}. The standard definition of classical consequence ⊧CL just follows
from the above and Definition 2.1, DCL = {1}.
3 Classical Recapture and Normality Operators
Kleene logics have been applied to a wide spectrum of phenomena, including partial
functions [17, 18], partial information [1], logic programs [14] (K3), semantical and
set-theoretical paradoxes [13, 19, 23, 25], and vagueness [26, 27] (K3 and LP). To
be sure, they are not the only many-valued logics to be applied to the phenomena
above. For instance, the so-called weak Kleene logics Kw3 by [8] and PWK by [16]
have been applied to set-theoretical paradoxes [8] and [16], semantical paradoxes,
vagueness, ambiguity and denotational failure [16]. Also, the four-valued logic FDE
has been designed to reason about information that can be partial (undetermined) or
overabundant (inconsistent).
The ‘normality story’ we sketched in Section 1 implies that we may want to use
classical reasoning when possible. The problem of how this can be done is the problem
of classical recapture.
6A conservative extension of a logic S is a superlogic S′ such that (i) the language of S′ extends the language of
S, (ii) any valid formula or rule expressed in the language of S is already in S.
7That is, Σ ⊧S ψ⇒ Σ ⊧CL ψ for S ∈ {K3,LP} and Σ ⊧CL ψ /⇒ Σ ⊧S ψ.
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3.1 Classical Recapture
The intuitive idea of classical recapture is that classical reasoning can somehow be
deployed in a weaker many-valued logic S. The very starting point of classical recap-
ture is that S itself do not offer the tools to recapture classical consequence. Thus,
a further logic S′ needs enter the stage. In particular, the role of S′ is to specify at
which conditions we may infer the classical consequences of a given premise-set Σ.
In order for this to be the case, we need S′ to be stronger than S. This can be
done in two ways [2]: either (a) we keep the initial language L fixed and define S′ as(L,⊧S′), or (b) we increase the expressive power of S and define S′ as a conservative
extension (L′,⊧S′) of S. The two options naturally suggest a formal definition of
classical recapture:
Problem 3.1 (Classical Recapture)
For every many-valued logic S weaker than CL and set Σ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L of formulas, the
problem of classical recapture is the problem of finding a consequence relation ⊧S′ and
a set Σ′ of formulas such that:
(i) Σ ⊧CL ψ ⇔ Σ′ ⊧S′ ψ;(ii) Σ ⊆ Σ′;(iii) Σ ⊧S ψ⇒ Σ ⊧S′ ψ;(iv) Σ′ ⊆ L or Σ′ ⊆ L′ for some extension L′ of L.
Accordingly, every solution to Problem 3.1 will have the form imposed by condition(i) above, and will fulfill conditions (ii)—(iv). If S′ satisfies condition (i)—(iv), we
will call it a classical recapture logic for S.
Also, we might want to recapture the inference of a many-valued logic S within a
weaker logic S′. This can be easily done by a natural adjustment of the definition of
Problem 3.1, thus yielding a more general problem of S-recapture. We will face one
such case in Section 4.
To the best of our knowledge, none has given a formal definition of the problem of
classical recapture before. With our present definition, we hope we can help settle
a reasonable package of formal requirements to impose on proposals that aim at
providing techniques for classical recapture.
The approach by [24] fall under option (a) above; extension of a logic S with
normality operators fall under option (b). We go to this approach now, and we show
that LP⊛ and K⊛3 are classical recapture logics for LP and K3.
3.2 Recapture via Normality
Here we establish a recapture result based of LP⊛ and K⊛3 . First, we need an auxiliary
notion:
Definition 3.2 (Normal Counterpart)
Given a set Σ ⊆ L2, we say that the set Σ⊛ = {⊛φ ∈ L1 ∣ φ ∈ Σ} is the normal
counterpart of Σ in L1.
Informally, the normal counterpart of a set of formulas is the set obtained by replac-
ing each φ ∈ Σ with ⊛φ. Thus, the normal counterpart of {φ,φ ⊃ ψ} is {⊛φ,⊛(φ ⊃ ψ)}.
8 Normality operators and Classical Recapture in Extensions of Kleene Logics
Since {φ}⊛ is {⊛φ}, we will just denote by ⊛φ the normal counterpart of a singleton{φ}. If both Σ and Σ⊛ appear as premises, this implies that the formulas in Σ are
classically true. Now we can establish our classical recapture theorem for LP⊛ and
K⊛3 :
Theorem 3.3 (Recapture via Normality)
If Σ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L1, then:
Σ ⊧CL ψ ⇔ ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Σ
⊛,Σ ⊧LP⊛ ψ
Σ,⊛ψ ⊧K⊛3 ψ
Proof. We start with LP⊛. We prove that, if Σ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L2, the following are equiv-
alent:
1. VLP⊛(Σ ∪Σ⊛) ⊆ VLP⊛(ψ)
2. {u ∈ ULP(Σ) ∣ u[Σ] = 1} ⊆ ULP(ψ)
3. UCL(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ)(1 ⇒ 2). The implication follows from the left-to-right direction of Fact 2.6, ν ∈V(Σ ∪Σ⊛) = {ν ∈ V ∣ ν[Σ] = 1}, and {u ∈ ULP(Σ) ∣ u[Σ] = 1} ⊆ ULP(Σ).(2⇒ 3). From the definition of UCL and UCL(Σ), we have that UCL(Σ) ⊆ {u ∈ US(Σ) ∣
u[Σ] = 1}. If {u ∈ US(Σ) ∣ u[Σ] = 1} ⊆ ULP(ψ), we have UCL(Σ) ⊆ ULP(ψ). From
this, it follows that UCL(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ)—otherwise, we would have {u ∈ US(Σ) ∣ u[Σ] =
1} ∩ {u ∈ US ∣ u(ψ) = 0}, which contradicts {u ∈ US(Σ) ∣ u[Σ] = 1} ⊆ ULP(ψ).
(3 ⇒ 2). Assume UCL(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ), and suppose that there is a u ∈ U such that
u[Σ] = 1 and u(ψ) = 0. We can build a corresponding classical model u′ ∈ UCL such
that u′[Σ] = u[Σ], u′(ψ) = u(ψ), and u(p) ≠ 1
2
for every p ∈ var. We have u′[Σ] = 1
and u′(ψ) = 0, which contradicts the initial assumption.(2⇒ 1). The implication follows from the fact that, for every φ ∈ L2 and ν ∈ V, we can
build a valuation u ∈ U such that u(p) = ν(p). Since ν ∈ V(Σ∪Σ⊛) = {ν ∈ V ∣ ν[Σ] = 1},
this implies that, if {u ∈ US(Σ) ∣ u[Σ] = 1} ⊆ US(ψ), then VS(Σ ∪Σ⊛) ⊆ VS(ψ). This
proves 1⇔ 3, which suffices to prove Σ,Σ⊛ ⊧LP⊛ ψ ⇔ Σ ⊧CL ψ.
We go to K⊛3 . We prove that, if Σ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L2, the following are equivalent:
1. VK⊛3 (Σ ∪ {⊛ψ}) ⊆ VK⊛3 (ψ)
2. (UK3(Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}) ⊆ UK3(ψ)
3. UCL(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ)(1⇒ 2). The implication follows from the left-to-right direction of Fact 2.6, VK⊛3 (Σ∪{⊛ψ}) = {ν ∈ V ∣ ν[Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}] = 1}, and {u ∈ U ∣ u[Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}] = 1} =UK3(Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}).(2⇒ 3). Assume (UK3(Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}) ⊆ UK3(ψ). From UCL(Σ) ⊆ UK3(Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}),
we have UCL(Σ) ⊆ UK3(ψ). Suppose UCL(Σ) ∩ UCL(ψ) ≠ ∅. This means that there is
a u ∈ UCL(Σ) such that u(ψ) = 0. Since UCL ⊆ UK3 , and DCL = DK3 we have that
u(ψ) = 0 for some u ∈ UK3(Σ). But this contradicts the initial hypothesis.
(3 ⇒ 2). From UCL(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ), UCL ⊆ UK3 , and DCL = DK3 , it follows thatUCL(Σ) ⊆ UK3(ψ). Suppose there is a u ∈ UK3(Σ ∪ {ψ ∨ ¬ψ}) such that u(ψ) ∉ DK3 .
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Since u(ψ ∨ ¬ψ) = 1, we have u(ψ) = 0. We can then build a model u′ ∈ U such that
u′(p) ≠ 1
2
, u′(Σ) = u(Σ), and u′(ψ) = u(ψ). But this contradicts UCL(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ).(2 ⇒ 1). From the left-to-right direction of Fact 2.6, we have Σ, ψ ∨ ¬ψ ⊧K3 ψ ⇒
Σ, ψ ∨ ¬ψ ⊧K⊛3 ψ. From this and u(ψ ∨ ¬ψ) = 1⇔ u(⊛ψ) = 1, we have Σ, ψ ∨ ¬ψ ⊧K3
ψ⇒ Σ,⊛ψ ⊧K⊛3 ψ. This proves 1⇔ 3, which in turn suffices to prove Σ,⊛ψ ⊧K⊛3 ψ ⇔
Σ ⊧CL ψ.
Remark 3.4
We can recapture classical reasoning in LP⊛ by assuming that the premise-set is
consistent, and in K⊛3 by assuming that the conclusion is consistent. The statements
in the theorem have the form required by condition (i) in Problem 3.1 and Σ ∪
Σ⊛ and Σ ∪ {⊛ψ} satisfy condition (iv). Notice that condition (ii) is fulfilled, and
condition (iii) is fulfilled—due to Fact 2.6. Thus, Theorem 3.3 provides a solution to
Problem 3.1. In particular, LP⊛ and K⊛3 are classical recapture logics for LP and K3,
respectively: in using them, we can deploy all the inferential power of the two Kleene
logics, and we can specify conditions at which we can reason classically.
Let us see how recapture via normality recovers the classical inferences or laws that
fail in LP and K3—see Section 2:(φ ∧ ¬φ),⊛(φ ∧ ¬φ) ⊧LP⊛ ψ Recapture of ECQ
Notice that recapture of ECQ is just another version of PGE. Similarly, LEM and
every classical tautology can be recaptured in K⊛3 :⊛φ ⊧K⊛3 φ ∨ ¬φ Recapture of LEM⊛φ ⊧K⊛3 φ, where φ is a classical tautology Recapture of TAUT
Again, recapture of LEM is just another version of PGI. Recapture of the Law of
Identity is an instance of Recapture of TAUT:⊛φ ⊧K⊛3 φ ⊃ φ Recapture of Law of Identity
Finally, the following inferences are valid in LP⊛ if all the formulas involved belong
to L2:
φ,φ ⊃ ψ,⊛φ,⊛(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊧LP⊛ ψ Recapture of MP¬ψ,φ ⊃ ψ,⊛¬ψ,⊛(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊧LP⊛ ¬φ Recapture of MT
φ ⊃ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ),⊛(φ ⊃ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)) ⊧LP⊛ ¬φ Recapture of RAA
φ ⊃ ψ,ψ ⊃ ζ,⊛(φ ⊃ ψ),⊛(ψ ⊃ ζ),⊧LP⊛ φ ⊃ ζ Recapture of Tr ⊃
4 Minimal Inconsistency and Recapture via Normality
Minimal inconsistency [24] applies to LP and it is based on the insight that, given
the premises from which we have to reason, we should assume that the situation is
no more inconsistent that we are forced to assume by the syntactic structure of the
premises. Below, we introduce minimal inconsistency, we compare it with recapture
via normality and we discuss what we consider benefits of the latter over the former.
Minimal Inconsistency. For every u ∈ ULP, we define the set
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u! = {p ∈ P ∣ u(p ∧ ¬p) ∈ DLP}
of the propositional variables that form a contradiction and are assigned value 1
2
in u [24, p.325]. The definition of u! plays a precise role in minimally inconsistency,
namely that of comparing valuations in terms of how much inconsistent they are. The
comparison follows the intuitive principle that the greater u! is, the more inconsistent
u is. This intuition is encoded in Priest’s definition of a consistency ordering [24,
p.325]:8
Definition 4.1 (Consistency ordering)
u ≤ u′ ⇔ u! ⊆ u′!
(u is less or equally inconsistent than u′ iff u! is contained in u′!).
The strict part of the relation (u < u′) equates with u! ⊂ u′!. The relation < (≤) is a
strict (weak) partial order ; in particular, < relates valuations in U from more to less
consistent, to the effect that u < u′ expresses that u is less inconsistent than u′; this
is the case when u! ⊂ u′!.
Definition 4.2 (Minimally inconsistent model, [24])
For every u ∈ ULP, u is a minimally inconsistent (mi-) model of Σ iff v ∈ ULP(Σ) and
u′ < u⇒ u′ ∉ ULP(Σ) (iff any less inconsistent u′ falsifies Σ).
In a nutshell, the mi-models of Σ are the valuations u ∈ U satisfying both (1)
u ∈ ULP(Σ), and (2) u(p) = 12 ⇒ p ∧ ¬p ∈ sub(Σ).9 We denote by ULPmi(Σ) the
set {u ∈ ULP(Σ) ∣ u′ < u ⇒ u′ ∉ ULP(Σ) for every u′ ∈ ULP} of the mi-models of Σ.
Minimally Inconsistent Consequence is defined as preservation of designated values in
mi-models [24, p.325]:
Definition 4.3 (Minimally Inconsistent Consequence)
Σ ⊧LPmi ψ ⇔ ULPmi(Σ) ⊆ ULP(ψ)
(ψ is a minimally inconsistent (mi-) consequence of Σ iff all the mi-models of Σ are
models of ψ).10
mi-consequence is non-monotonic, since extending Σ with further information may
lead to loose previously drawn consequences. As an example [24]: q is a mi-consequence
of {p, p ⊃ q}, but it is not an mi-consequence of {p∧¬p}∪{p, p ⊃ q}, since there is a mi-
model u of {p, p ⊃ q, p∧¬p} where u(q) = 0. Thus, we have Σ ⊧LPmi ψ /⇒ Σ, φ ⊧LPmi ψ.
The following is a fact that we will presuppose in what follows:11
Fact 4.4 (Fact 1, [24])
Σ ⊧LP ψ ⇒ Σ ⊧LPmi ψ ⇒ Σ ⊧CL ψ
Minimal inconsistency and recapture. Here we show that minimal inconistency
offers a particular way to recapture of classical consequence. More precisely: with
minimal inconsistency, we can reason classically whenever the premise-set has a clas-
sical model; otherwise, we must resort to LP-reasoning :
8The definition we use here is just the special case of Priest’s definition for propositional logic.
9Here sub(φ) denotes the set of subformulas of φ. As for the rationale of clause (2): take Σ = {p,p ∧ ¬p}, and
assume u! = {p, r} for some r ∉ var(Σ). We have u ∈ ULP(Σ), but we also have another valuation u′ of Σ such
that u′! = {p}. We have u′ < u. In a nutshell, no minimally inconsistent model of Σ assigns a non-classical value to
variables out of var(Σ).
10Notice that the valuations of ψ needs not be mi-models of ψ.
11Notice that none of the converses of these implications hold [24].
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Proposition 4.5UCL(Σ) ≠ ∅ ⇒ (Σ ⊧LPmi ψ ⇔ Σ ⊧CL ψ)
Proof. If UCL(Σ) ≠ ∅, then ULPmi(Σ) = UCL(Σ), by Definition 4.2. As a consequence,ULPmi(Σ) ⊆ UCL(ψ) iff UCL(Σ) ⊆ ULP(ψ). But this equates with Σ ⊧LPmi ψ⇔ Σ ⊧CL ψ
if UCL(Σ) ≠ ∅.
What if UCL(Σ) = ∅? Well, we can have different cases here. For instance, the
classically valid inference from p, p ⊃ q, r ∧ ¬r to q is valid also in LPmi. Indeed, the
mi-models of {p, p ⊃ q, r ∧ ¬r} assign 1 to p and p ⊃ q, and 1
2
to r (only). As a
consequence, such models will also assign 1 to q as well. By contrast, the inference
from p, p ⊃ q, p∧¬p to q fails in LPmi—see example above—while it is classically valid.
The latter suffices to show that the three conditions VCL(Σ) = ∅, VCL(Σ) ⊆ VCL(ψ) andVLP(Σ) /⊆ VLP(ψ) may be compatible with VLPmi(Σ) /⊆ VLPmi(ψ), for an adequate choice
of Σ and ψ. This implies that, if VCL(Σ) = ∅, then condition (i) from Problem 3.1
may not be met.
In a nutshell, minimal inconsistency secures classical reasoning if our premise-set
has a classical model, but it does not secure classical reasoning otherwise. We will
then say that mi-consequence provides a partial solution to the problem of classical
recapture, and that it gives rise to a partial classical recapture logic for LP.
A corollary of Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 4.5, is that recapture via normality and
via minimal inconsistency coincide when the premise-set has a classical valuation:
Corollary 4.6
If Σ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L2 and UCL(Σ) ≠ ∅, then
Σ⊛,Σ ⊧LP⊛ ψ ⇔ Σ ⊧LPmi ψ
This is no surprise: all successful methods of classical recapture spots exactly the
same premise-set/conclusion pairs, namely the pairs in the relation of classical conse-
quence. Once again, a comparison of the two approaches must hinge on extra-logical
features of the two approaches. We go to this issue in the discussion below (Sec-
tion 4.2).
4.1 Addition of Information in a minimally inconsistent setting
Here, we present some facts that help get a more general view on the exact role played
by addition of inconsistent information to a set of initial premises. An interesting
consequence of such an interaction is that, if the information (that is, the set of
propositional variables) of a given premise-set Σ is already contained in an LPmi
conclusion of Σ, then the inference is also valid in LP.
Fact 4.7
For every u ∈ U , if u(φ) ∈ DLP and {p1, . . . , pk} ⊆ var(φ), then u′(φ) ∈ DLP for every
u′ ∈ U such that u′(p) = 1
2
for some (every) p ∈ {p1, . . . , pk} and u′(q) = u(q) for every
q ∉ {p1, . . . , pk}.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the complexity of φ.
Let Xu,φ be the set {u′ ∈ U ∣ u[p1, . . . , pk] = 12 for some {p1, . . . , pk} ⊆ var(φ) and
u′(q) = u(q) for every q ∉ {p1, . . . , pk}} of the valuations in U that coincide with u
except for some variables in φ. A corollary of Fact 4.7 above is:
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Corollary 4.8
For every u ∈ U and u′ ∈Xu,φ, u(φ) ∈ DLP ⇒ u′(φ) ∈ DLP
Fact 4.7 and Corollary 4.8 help us prove two interesting facts about minimal incon-
sistency. First, addition of information that is irrelevant w.r.t. the initial premises
does not force us to drop previously held consequences:
Fact 4.9
var(Σ) ∩ var(Σ′) = ∅ ⇒ (Σ ⊧LPmi ψ ⇒ Σ,Σ′ ⊧LPmi ψ)
Proof. Assume var(Σ) ∩ var(Σ′) = ∅ and Σ ⊧LPmi ψ as the initial hypothesis. We
distinguish two cases. Case 1): UCL(Σ′) ≠ ∅. ULPmi(Σ∪Σ′) ⊆ ULPmi(Σ). Since Σ ⊧LPmi
ψ, this implies ULPmi(Σ∪Σ′) ⊆ ULP(ψ), which in turn equates with Σ,Σ′ ⊧LPmi ψ. Case
2): UCL(Σ′) = ∅. We distinguish two subcases. Case 2.1): var(Σ′) ∩ var(ψ) = ∅.
For every u ∈ ULPmi(Σ ∪ Σ′), there is a u′ ∈ ULPmi(Σ) such that u′(ψ) = u(ψ) and
u′(φ) = u(φ) for every φ ∈ Σ. This implies that, if Σ,Σ′ /⊧LPmi ψ, then Σ /⊧LPmi ψ.
But this contradicts the initial hypothesis. Case 2.2): var(Σ′) ∩ var(ψ) = ∅. From
Fact 4.7, if follows that if ULPmi(Σ) ⊆ ULP(ψ), thenULPmi(Σ∪Σ′) ⊆ ULP(ψ). Given the
initial assumption, this implies Σ,Σ′ ⊧LPmi ψ.
Notice that addition of relevant inconsistent information is a necessary condition
for monotonicity in minimal inconsistency, but it is not a sufficient condition. For
instance, we have p, p ⊃ q ⊧LPmi q—see above—and also p, p ⊃ q, q∧¬q ⊧. Indeed, all the
LP-models satisfying q∧¬q (and a fortiori, all the mi-models of {p, p ⊃ q, q∧¬q}), also
satisfy q. The next fact reveals a class of cases where addition of relevant information
does not force nonmonotonicity:
Proposition 4.10
Σ ⊧LPmi ψ ⇒ (var(Σ′) ⊆ var(ψ) ⇒ Σ,Σ′ ⊧LPmi ψ)
Proof. Assume Σ ⊧LPmi ψ and var(Σ′) ⊆ var(ψ) as the initial hypothesis. For every
Σ ⊆ L, take the set IΣ = {p ∈ var(Σ) ∣ u(p) ≠ 12 ⇒ u(φ) = 0 for some φ ∈ Σ} of the
variables from Σ whose inconsistency is indispensable for Σ to be designated. We
have that ULPmi(Σ) = {u ∈ ULP(Σ) ∣ u(p) = 12 ⇔ p ∈ IΣ}. From this an the initial
hypothesis, we have {u ∈ ULP(Σ) ∣ u(p) = 12 ⇔ p ∈ IΣ} ⊆ ULP(ψ). From this and
Corollary 4.8, it follows that {u ∈ ULP(Σ ∪ Σ′) ∣ u(p) = 12 ⇔ p ∈ IΣ∪Σ′} ⊆ ULP(ψ).
Indeed, take a u ∈ ULPmi(Σ) such that p ≠ 12 for every p ∈ var(Σ′)∖ var(IΣ), and take
any u′ ∈ U where u′(p) = 1
2
for every p ∈ IΣ∪Σ′ and u′(q) = u(q) for every q ∉ IΣ∪Σ′ .
Clearly, u′ ∈ ULPmi(Σ∪Σ′). Also, u′ ∈Xu,ψ. From this and Corollary 4.8, u′(ψ) ∈ DLP.
Since u′ is arbitrary, we have {u ∈ ULP(Σ ∪ Σ′) ∣ u(p) = 12 ⇔ p ∈ IΣ∪Σ′} ⊆ ULP(ψ)
and, as a consequence, Σ,Σ′ ⊧LPmi ψ.
Finally, the next result individuates a condition at which mi-consequence coincides
with LP-consequence:
Fact 4.11
var(Σ) ⊆ var(ψ) ⇒ (Σ ⊧LPmi ψ ⇔ Σ ⊧LP ψ)
Proof. Assume var(Σ) ⊆ var(ψ) and Σ ⊧LPmi ψ as the initial hypothesis. (⇐) It fol-
lows immediately from Fact 4.4. (⇒) Remind the definition IΣ = {p ∈ var(Σ) ∣ u(p) ≠
1
2
⇒ u(φ) = 0 for some φ ∈ Σ} of the set of the variables from Σ whose inconsistency is
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indispensable for Σ to be designated, and take the class KΣ = {u ∈ ULP(Σ) ∣ u(q) = 12
for some q ∈ var(Σ) ∖ IΣ}. Since var(Σ) ⊆ var(ψ), from Corollary 4.8 we have that
u(ψ) ∈ DLP for every u ∈ KΣ. But since KΣ suffices to generate all the LP-models of
Σ, this implies Σ ⊧LP ψ.
4.2 Discussion on Recapture via Normality and Minimal Inconsistency
Here, we compare recapture via normality and minimal inconsistency on the ground
of the symmetry (asymmetry) between evidence of inconsistency and consistency.
Suppose we are reasoning in LPmi and our assumptions is the premise-set {φ,φ ⊃ ψ}.
By Proposition 4.5, we can reason classically from it. Now suppose that we hit
‘against evidence for inconsistency’ relative to {φ,φ ⊃ ψ}. Suppose that, after hitting
against such evidence, we assume {φ ∧ ¬φ,φ,φ ⊃ ψ}. Again by Proposition 4.5, we
will withdraw the conclusion ψ. Since we are facing evidence-based reasoning of an
agent, we can take premise-sets to be information sets, from which the agent draws
her conclusions. Information-sets can of course be extended by new information, and
this is what happens in our example: we have extended our initial information-set by
including the information that φ is inconsistent. In LPmi, information can so increase
as to exclude that we are facing a consistent situation. However, things are different
if we receive evidence that we are positively facing a consistent situation. By Fact 2.5,
no formula in LP+ implies that φ ∧ ¬φ is classically false. This implies that, in the
setting by [24], no increase of information can ever exclude that we are facing an
inconsistent situation.
The above brings a puzzling asymmetry in, namely: when reasoning via LPmi,
we can increase our information by receiving evidence of inconsistency, but not by
receiving evidence of consistency. As for the chance for evidence of consistency, we
believe there are some reasonable examples: while the logical structure of the Liar
sentence itself is evidence (quite conclusive) of an inconsistent situation, the logical
structure of (say) ‘I am playing football’ is evidence (though maybe not conclusive) of
a consistent situation. And we would like to state this. However, if our language is L2,
we cannot. Also, take the application of paraconsistent logic to vagueness. Empirical
information could give evidence of the fact that ‘Jude Law is bald’ (j) expresses a
borderline case of baldness and is, then, an inconsistent sentence. However, suitable
empirical information would also give evidence that ‘Ben Kingsley is bald’ (b) does not
express a borderline case, and in this case, we would like to state that that sentence
is consistent—that is, either classically true, or classically false.
The import of the above fact can be better grasped with an epistemic analogy:
suppose that reasoners only make given assumptions (i.e., assert the formulas in a
premise-set) if they have received persuasive information—that is, information that
leads you to attribute probability 1 to the formulas in question. Then, the asymmetry
above equates with the fact that reasoners can be sure that an inconsistency is at
stake, but they cannot be sure that the situation is perfectly consistent.
By contrast, recapture via normality does not bring any asymmetry in. Again, we
can add φ ∧ ¬φ after receiving evidence of inconsistency of φ. However, we can also
add ⊛φ,⊛(φ ⊃ ψ) if we get evidence that we are facing a normal case. In particular,
in LP⊛ we can use j ∧ ¬j to state that ‘Jude Law is bald and not bald’ (hence, a
14 Normality operators and Classical Recapture in Extensions of Kleene Logics
borderline case of baldness) and b ∧ ⊛b to state that ‘Ben Kingsley is bald and is
not a borderline case of baldness.’ By running the epistemic analogy again: with
recapture via normality, reasoners can be sure that an inconsistency is at stake, but
they can also be sure that the situation is perfectly consistent. Indeed, information
can increase both because evidence of inconsistency and evidence of consistency.12
5 Extensions of Kleene Logics, Normality Operators, Logics
of Formal Inconsistency and Undeterminedness
In this section, we go through the connections between LP⊛ and LFIs, Theorem 3.3
and Derivability Adjustment Theorems [11, 20], definability issues and semantical
closure.
Theorem 3.3 and Derivability Adjustment Theorems. Results similar to Theo-
rem 3.3 appear in the tradition of LFIs, where they are usually referred to as Derivabil-
ity Adjustment Theorems. [20, Theorem 3.11] establishes a similar classical recapture
theorem for the paraconsistent logic bC [9], and [20, Theorem 3.46] proves a particular
recapture that involves a satisfaction-preserving translation τ from CL to the para-
consistent logic Ci [20]. We briefly comment on the differences between Theorem 3.3
and these results.
First, Derivability Adjustment Theorems involve the derivability relation—whence
the name—and their proofs display a proof-theoretical approach, while the proof of
Theorem 3.3 relies on semantical considerations. Second, Theorem 3.11 from [20] re-
lies on adding the normal counterpart of some set ∆ of well-formed formulas, and not
necessarily the normal counterpart of the premise-set Σ itself. Third, Theorem 3.46
from [20] relies on translating CL into Ci. By contrast, no translation is needed for
our purposes. Fourth, the wide majority of Derivability Adjustment Theorems above
apply to paraconsistent logics, and give no recipe for recapture in paracomplete logics,
while Theorem 3.3 does. One exception is [11, Theorem 7.2.20], which applies to the
paracomplete logic Kw3 from [8]. That result differs from Theorem 3.3 since it focuses
on propositional variables from the conclusion, not on the conclusion itself. This focus
is not necessary for Theorem 3.3. Fifth and final, none of the Derivability Adjustment
Theorems comes with a comparison with other current recapture techniques—such as
minimal inconsistency.
We believe that these differences speak for the relevance of our approach and results.
In particular, the semantical methodology that we follow in this paper allows for an
easier comparison with other approaches to recapture, and especially with minimal
inconsistency, which has a strong semantical focus, and a relatively undeveloped proof
12Notice that LP⊛ does not provide, per se, any belief-revision (or better, information-revision) procedure, contrary
to LP⊛ (Graham Priest brought this to our attention in private conversation. However, it is easy to extend the
semantical and linguistic setting of LP⊛ with operations analogous to expansion, contraction from AGM theory [3].
Once this is done, it is possible to use the resulting extension of LP⊛ in order to capture belief-revision. In particular,
the additional reasoning power would help up model situations where φ ∧ ¬φ is included in the initial premise-set,
and information that ⊛φ is released. In the basic LP⊛ setting, {φ ∧ ¬φ,⊛φ} has no model, but if we describe this
situation via a revision-like operator, we will end up in a situation where φ ∧ ¬φ and its consequences are dropped
from the premise-set, in favor of ⊛. Of course, the new setting would also capture the opposite situation, where
information of φ ∧ ¬φ trumps previous information that ⊛φ, via AGM-style revision.
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theory. Also, our comparison with other approaches (Section 4) has highlighted the
conceptual merits of recapture via normality. In turn, this shows that the approach
followed by us and researchers in the LFI/LFU traditions is not only mathematically
interesting, but also an appealing tool for conceptual applications (for instance, to
revision of assumptions in presence of new information).
LP and the Logic LFI1 of formal inconsistency. The language L3(P) of the logic
of formal inconsistency LFI1 is defined by the following Backus-Naur form (BNF):
φ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬φ ∣ φ ∨ ψ ∣ φ ∧ ψ ∣ φ→ ψ ∣ ●φ
The logic LFI1 has been first introduced by [10], and it obtains by setting DLFI1 ={ 1
2
,1}, and by extending a valuation function n ∶ P z→ {0, 1
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The following established fact that will be relevant below.
Proposition 5.1
The following negation connective ∼ is definable in LP⊛ and LFI1:
∼ φ ∶=LP⊛ ⊛φ ∧ ¬φ ∼ φ ∶=LFI1 ¬ ● φ ∧ ¬φ
The next definability result clarifies the relations between LP⊛ and LFI1 is estab-
lished by the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2
The following operators are definable in LP⊛:
1a. ●φ ∶=LP⊛ ¬ ⊛ φ 1b. ⊛φ ∶=LFI1 ¬ ● φ
2. φ→ ψ ∶=LP⊛ ∼ φ ∨ ψ
Definability of ∼ as ⊛φ∧¬φ and ●φ as ¬⊛φ is from [10]; definability of → in LP⊛ is
proved by [21].13 Definability of → implies that a detachable conditional14 is definable
in LP⊛. A consequence of Proposition 5.2 is that LP⊛ and LFI1 are the same logic,
and the Hilbert-style axiomatization of LFI1 by [10] extends to LP⊛—with the obvious
rephrasing of ● into ¬⊛.
Since no current formalism in the LFU tradition is equivalent to K⊛3 —to the best of
our knowledge—we prefer to keep the label LP⊛ instead of LFI1 for our paraconsistent
13The results from [10] and [21] are proved relative to the consistency operator ○. Since ⊛ and ○ are equivalent in
any three-valued paraconsistent logic, these results immediately extend to ⊛ and LP⊛.
14That is, a conditional that obeys MP.
16 Normality operators and Classical Recapture in Extensions of Kleene Logics
logic, since this allows for a uniformity of presentation with K⊛3 .15
Normality operator and semantical closure. A language L is semantically closed
when it contains its own truth predicate Tr and names φ for every formula φ ∈ L.
Semantical closure is related to the derivation of paradoxes. One prominent exam-
ple is the Liar paradox, consisting in the sentence ‘λ iff λ is false’—in symbols, λ
iff ¬Tr(λ).16 In CL, semantical closure and the resulting Liar paradox bring trivi-
alization. LP and K3 escape this, but things get more troublesome for semantically
closed LP⊛ and K⊛3 : semantically closed LP⊛ and K⊛3 are trivial—see [5, 10] and [15],
respectively.17
However, these facts concerning LP⊛ and K⊛3 do not generalize to all many-valued
logics including a normality operator. In particular, [5] proves that infectious logics
endowed with a normality operator are non-trivial. These logic assign a non-classical
value to any formula φ ∈ L2 if and only if at least one subformula ψ of φ has a
non-classical value assigned. The most prominent examples are the three-valued Kw
⊛
3
and PWK⊛ from [8] and [16]. The former designates 1 only, and PWK⊛ obtains by
designating the third value as well. A consequence of the result by [5] is that the







⊛ can be suitable logics for reasoning about truth, it is for a
dedicated investigation to say. To the purposes of this paper, suffices it to notice that
it is possible to have logics that are semantically closed, include normality operators
and are non-trivial.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced the logics LP⊛ and K⊛3 , which extend the Kleene
logics LP and K3 with a normality operator. This operator helps express that a
formula as a classical truth value (namely, 0 or 1). We have established a classical
recapture result (Theorem 3.3,) which secures that, if given conditions hold, we can
deploy classical reasoning in LP⊛ and K⊛3 . We have then compared our approach
with one established approach to classical recapture, namely minimal inconsistency
by [24]. In particular, we have discussed their respective merits on the ground of
their descriptive adequacy with respect to some phenomena concerning information.
We have discussed the relations between LP⊛ and the Logics of Formal Inconsistency
from [10, 11, 20, 22], among normality operators and consistency and determinedness
operators in the style of [10, 11, 20, 22, 28], and between normality operators and
semantical closure.
15We do not go through a proof theory for K⊛3 , especially for reasons of space and coherence with the main focus of
the present paper. Notice, however, that a sound and complete natural deduction should not be difficult to obtain,
given natural deduction for K3 and the behavior of ⊛.
16Here, we are neutral on the exact nature of the ‘iff’. Some logics, such as K3, requires it to be a material
biconditional; others, like LP, requires it to be interderivability or semantical equivalence.
17Notice that minimal inconsistency is not necessarily in a better situation, albeit for a very different reason.
Indeed, as noticed by Hartry Field in private conversation, Curry’s paradox has a classical model, and as a conse-
quence, its trivializing conclusion can be inferred in LPmi by using a ‘safe’ instance of Modus Ponens.
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